Abhinava Anyathā Khyāti or the Dvaita Theory of Error

Summary

P. S. Venkatasubbarao analyses the epistemology of the Dvaita school by examining its treatment of perceptual error, called anyathā khyāti. He surveys classical Indian theories of illusion—the Advaita view that the object of illusion is indescribable (anirvacanīya), the Buddhist view that it is unreal (asatkhyāti) and the Vishishtadvaita view that it is real (satkhyāti). Dvaita thinkers led by Jayatīrtha formulated an ‘abhinava anyathā khyāti’ in which the error arises from the superimposition of a previously perceived real object on a different substratum. Venkatasubbarao traces the arguments of Jayatīrtha and later commentators who reject substrateless illusion and maintain that both the shell and the silver seen in a shell‑silver illusion are real; the mind mistakes the shell for silver by importing a memory image. He reviews Dvaita critiques of asatkhyāti and shows how the theory preserves the independent reality of the object and the cognition, thereby upholding the dualistic ontology of Madhva. The article addresses objections that the error cannot involve real entities and emphasises the role of defective perception, memory and the operation of the sense organs. Venkatasubbarao concludes that Abhinava anyathā khyāti avoids the pitfalls of both Advaita and Buddhist theories by positing a misrelation between two real objects, and thus provides a coherent account of illusion compatible with the realistic foundations of Dvaita Vedānta.