British Relations With Burma (1864‑1868)

Summary

This historical essay examines Anglo–Burmese relations in the years immediately following the Indian Mutiny. After two Anglo‑Burmese wars much of Burma was under British control, and the post‑Mutiny phase centred on regularising commercial relationsfile:///home/oai/share/563021_compressed-273-356.pdf#:~:text=British%20Relations%20With%20Burma%20%281864,side%20of%20the%20border%20were. A landmark was the Commercial Treaty of 10 November 1862 between the Government of India and the Court of Ava. Article VIII promised that if the British abolished customs duties at the frontier posts of Thayet‑myo and Prome within a year, the Burmese king would similarly abolish his duties at Maloon and another post after one to four yearsfile:///home/oai/share/563021_compressed-273-356.pdf#:~:text=lishment%20of%20proper%20commercial%20relations,duties%20upon%20goods%20passing%20up. The aim was to remove intermediate customs on goods carried along the Irrawaddy River and encourage free trade. Britain removed its duties in June 1863 but Burma was allowed four years to reciprocate. Colonel Arthur Phayre, the commissioner for British Burma, sought to amend the treaty in Britain’s favour. Dr Williams and later Captain Sladen, the British agents at Mandalay, negotiated with the Burmese minister to obtain fixed tariff schedules and to eliminate irregular dues. Williams complained that customs officials at Manhla charged arbitrary rates and asked for proper tariff values; after prolonged discussion the Burmese minister eventually provided schedules of export values for frontier tradefile:///home/oai/share/563021_compressed-273-356.pdf#:~:text=A%20fiixed%20Tariff%20Rate%20On,150. Another contentious issue was the so‑called ‘Royal excise’—additional duties of 1–7 % imposed by Burma even after the treaty. British officials argued that this practice contradicted the spirit of the treaty because Britain had already sacrificed revenue by abolishing its duties. They advocated a gradual reduction of all duties, but the Burmese minister contended that revenue from frontier customs was essentialfile:///home/oai/share/563021_compressed-273-356.pdf#:~:text=Dities%20%2C%20In%20addition%20to,Government. The essay describes continued disputes over tariff lists, British pressure for a convention to revise Article V, and Burmese reluctance to forgo revenue. It also hints at other diplomatic issues—such as residency of British agents and the question of recognising the Burmese monarch—but the focus remains economic. Overall the author portrays the period 1864‑68 as a transition from military conquest to commercial negotiation. The British used economic leverage to secure favourable terms, while Burmese ministers negotiated cautiously to preserve sovereignty and revenue.