British Policy towards the Afghan War of Succession (1863-68)
By Anil Chandra Banerjee
Summary
British Policy towards the Afghan War of Succession (1863–68) examines the internal struggle for power in Afghanistan following the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan and the corresponding diplomatic moves of the British government. The article narrates the revolts led by the Amir’s sons Afzal Khan and Azim Khan against their brother Sher Ali, describing military manoeuvres, tribal alliances, and the shifting fortunes of the contenders during the first revolt (June 1863–May 1864), a second revolt (1864–65) and the final stages of the war. Drawing on official correspondence and contemporary reports, it analyses how the Government of India oscillated between a policy of strict neutrality and covert support for Sher Ali, weighing the benefits of non‑intervention against the need to prevent Russian influence and frontier instability. Letters from British agents at Kabul and Peshawar reveal disagreements over how far to help Sher Ali, while Governor‑General’s minutes and Foreign Office dispatches illustrate the complexities of making policy from Calcutta. The article assesses how the British eventually supplied arms, money and recognition to Sher Ali, enabling him to recapture Kabul and consolidate his rule by 1868. It also examines the broader geopolitical context of the “Great Game,” highlighting Afghan factionalism and the British desire to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the article portrays British policy during the Afghan War of Succession as cautious and pragmatic. The Government of India sought to avoid direct intervention yet slowly shifted to support Sher Ali when it became clear that a stable, friendly ruler served British strategic interests. By carefully balancing neutrality and assistance, the British helped Sher Ali re‑establish control, but the war exposed the fragility of Afghan politics and underscored the importance of Afghanistan in imperial calculations.