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Mati in the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra

By Eiichi Yamaguchi

Vol. 14 · No. 021966pp. 19 - 37English

Summary

This detailed article investigates the term ""mati"", a key epistemological concept in Jain philosophy, particularly as presented in Umasvati’s Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (TAS). The study clarifies how the word has been used in Jain texts and its transformation from a broad meaning of cognition to a narrower sense of sensory perception. Key Concepts and Insights 1. Meaning and Scope of Mati i) Mati-A (Broad Sense): Includes all forms of cognition excluding sruta (verbal testimony), avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala-jñāna — i.e., the knowledge of ordinary beings. ii) Mati-B (Narrow Sense): Specifically refers to sense perception (pratyakṣa) and is considered a subset of mati-A. 2. Subtypes of Mati-B (Sense Perception) i) Mati-B is subdivided into four cognitive stages: ii) Avagraha: Indistinct grasping of an object. iii) Ihā: Intellectual effort to identify what was grasped. iv) Avāya: Final identification. v) Dhāraṇā: Sustained retention, memory, and impression. vi) These are discussed in the context of perception, cognition, and meditation and parallel the Upaniṣadic fourfold scheme of dṛṣṭi (faith), śravaṇa (hearing), manana (reflection), and nididhyāsana (meditation). 3. Originating Instruments i) Three types of mati based on instruments: a) Indriya-nimitta: From senses alone (e.g., one-sensed beings). b) Anindriya-nimitta: From mind alone (e.g., memory). c) Indriya-anindriya-nimitta: From both senses and mind (e.g., determinate perception, recognition). 4. Interpretive Ambiguity i) The article explores ambiguity around whether mati refers to: a) Reflection (manana) — especially in spiritual and philosophical contexts, or b) Perception (pratyakṣa) — as in empirical epistemology. 5. Subclassifications and Variations i) TAS 1.16 lists variations of mati such as: a) Bahu/Alpa (many/one objects) b) Nihsṛta/Anihsṛta (based on verbal testimony or not) c) Dhurva/Adhurva (constant/inconstant cognition) d) Sandigdha/Asandigdha (clear/unclear perception) e) These distinctions are easier to apply if mati is interpreted as manana (reflective thought). 6. The Order of Mati and Śruta i) Traditionally, śruta-jñāna (verbal knowledge) is said to follow mati-jñāna. ii) However, if mati = manana (reflection), then śruta must precede it — creating a theoretical tension. iii) Siddhasena Gani supports that reflection arises after hearing, i.e., śruta precedes mati in spiritual cognition. 7. Limitations Both mati and śruta can grasp all substances (dravya) but not all modes (paryāya) due to limitations of sensory and verbal expression.

Conclusion

The paper argues for interpreting mati primarily as "manana" (reflection) rather than mere sensory perception. This aligns it with ancient Indian spiritual traditions and resolves many ambiguities and contradictions in the application of the concept within Jain epistemology.

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