Somatism of Vedic Psychology

Summary

In this philosophical essay, the author argues that early Indian thought did not conceive of mind as a separate immaterial entity but considered mental functions to be attributes or modifications of a material substance. The paper begins by examining the term manas in Vedic literature. The author suggests that manas originally referred to mana, an all-pervading fluid substance, and that the earliest conceptions of psychological phenomena were somatic. Vedic hymns treat mental states as functions of bodily organs; for example, thought is described as a product of the heart or the breath. The essay traces this concept through the Upanishads, noting that in some passages manas is listed among bodily organs and is subject to birth and decay. Later Indian philosophical systems, including Buddhism and Yoga, preserved this materialist view: they held that consciousness (citta) and its modifications are momentary and conditioned by physical factors. The article contrasts this with the dualist doctrines of later Vedanta, which posit a distinct soul or mind, arguing that such distinctions arose relatively late. It also examines how the concept of prana (vital breath) interacts with manas in early texts, pointing out that the two are often identified or treated as aspects of the same vital fluid. The author engages with Western interpretations of Indian psychology, critiquing attempts to read Cartesian dualism into ancient texts. Instead, he shows how early Indian languages lacked abstract terms for “mind” and instead used metaphorical descriptions tied to sensory experiences. Through philological analysis of Vedic and Brahmanic passages, the essay argues that the evolution from somatism to psychologism occurred gradually, reflecting a broader shift from ritualism to philosophical speculation. The conclusion emphasises that understanding ancient Indian psychology requires recognising its somatic roots and avoiding anachronistic projections of modern mental concepts.