Omniscience
By S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri
Summary
This philosophical essay tackles three interrelated questions about omniscience: whether the Yogic inference that a being free of obstacles must be omniscient should be abandoned, whether the Advaitin concept of a witnessing self resolves problems in claiming omniscience, and whether omniscience is intelligible or compatible with human freedom. The author surveys arguments from Nyaya, Mimamsa, Yoga and Vedanta, noting that scriptural passages assert the Lord’s all‑knowingness and that inference likens the universe’s creation to complex human works, implying an omniscient creator. Critics, however, either deny the existence of a creator or argue that inference is insufficient. Advaitins propose an attributeless witness‑self (saksin) whose knowledge does not entail duality, but this is deemed unhelpful. The article concludes that the only defensible omniscience is an identity with Brahman—as svarupa‑jnana, pure knowledge of the self—because in this state there is nothing else to know. Thus the concept of omniscience as knowledge of infinite facts is untenable, while omniscience as pure self‑knowledge avoids contradictions and preserves human freedom. The discussion reveals the subtle interplay between epistemology and theology in Indian philosophy.
Conclusion
Through careful philosophical scrutiny, the article maintains that omniscience cannot be coherently justified as an attribute of a personal creator using standard inference, nor salvaged through obscure Advaitin notions of a witness‑self. Instead, omniscience is tenable only when equated with realisation of the absolute—the self as knowledge itself—where nothing remains as object. This view preserves human freedom by precluding a cosmic intelligence dictating individual acts. The discussion illuminates subtle intersections between epistemology and theology in Indian philosophy.