A Query On Bhavya And Abhavya.
By L. A. Phaltane
Summary
The query addresses the Jain concepts of *bhavya* (liberable) and *abhavya* (non-liberable) souls, questioning their compatibility with core Jain principles. The author notes that Jainism traditionally posits two substances: *jiva* (living, conscious) and *ajiva* (non-living, inert), with *jiva* possessing undifferentiated and differentiated cognition. Since *jiva* and *ajiva* are distinct, *jiva* should theoretically be separable from karma and capable of liberation. However, some Jain texts suggest the existence of *abhavya jivas*, souls eternally bound to karma and incapable of liberation. This contradicts Jain teachings on universal emancipation and verses from Nemichandra’s *Dravyasangraha* and the *Ratnakarandaha Shravakachara*, which describe liberated souls (*siddha*) as attaining upward motion and shedding karma. The author argues that *abhavya jivas* would render these teachings inconsistent, as liberation becomes impossible for some souls. A Charvaka materialist critique is also raised, questioning the distinction between *abhavya jivas* (souls permanently trapped in matter) and a purely materialistic view of consciousness. The author asserts that if *jiva* is inherently upayogmaya (capable of liberation), then all *jivas* must eventually attain emancipation. The query seeks clarification on the historical and doctrinal basis for distinguishing *bhavya* and *abhavya* souls, particularly whether ancient Jain acharyas like Kundakunda endorsed this classification. The author requests further explanation in a subsequent issue of *The Jaina Gazette*.
Conclusion
This inquiry into *bhavya* and *abhavya* souls challenges Jain doctrine by questioning the implications of irreversible spiritual bondage. The analysis exposes a critical tension: if certain *jivas* are inherently incapable of liberation (*abhavya*), it contradicts core Jain tenets like universal emancipation and the soul’s inherent capacity for upward motion (*vissasoddhagai*). The argument highlights a paradox—how can a soul’s liberation be denied without aligning with materialistic views that equate consciousness with matter? This critique underscores the need for clarity on the historical and philosophical consistency of *bhavya/abhavya* distinctions, particularly regarding ancient Jain teachings and the material defects purportedly rendering souls irredeemable. The inquiry calls for a rigorous examination of these concepts to resolve doctrinal inconsistencies and defend Jainism’s universal promise of liberation.