Gautama's Doubt: Mahavira's Solution

Summary

This piece from the Gandharavāda reproduces Mahavira’s philosophical response to Indrabhuti Gautama’s scepticism about the soul. Gautama argues that the soul’s existence cannot be proved because it is not perceptible like a jar, cannot be inferred without prior perception of a soul–mark relation, and cannot be accepted on scriptural authority because scriptural statements conflictfile:///home/oai/share/jain_journal_1987_04_520086_hr6_ocred.pdf. Mahavira responds that doubt, self‑awareness and the notion of ‘I’ are direct perceptions of the soul; the capacity to reflect on one’s own experience is itself proof of an enduring, conscious selffile:///home/oai/share/jain_journal_1987_04_520086_hr6_ocred.pdf#:~:text=,a%20reference%20to%20activity%20of. He refutes materialist interpretations by pointing out that knowledge and doubt cannot inhere in a corporeal body, which is inert like a jar; therefore there must be a separate substance, the soul, possessing these attributesfile:///home/oai/share/jain_journal_1987_04_520086_hr6_ocred.pdf#:~:text=,Accept%20this%20as. Mahavira further argues that by inference one can recognise consciousness in other bodies from their intentional behaviour and aversions. The dialogue explores the nature of attributes and substances, emphasising that knowledge arises in the soul and not from the elements. Mahavira’s explanation dissolves Gautama’s doubt; the latter acknowledges that his scepticism came from misunderstanding the Vedic terms ‘mass of consciousness’ and becomes convinced that the soul is real. The dialogue concludes with the note that Gautama and his 500 followers accepted Mahavira’s teachingfile:///home/oai/share/jain_journal_1987_04_520086_hr6_ocred.pdf#:~:text=,that%20the%20soul%20exists%20in. The piece illustrates the Jain epistemological framework, which accepts direct cognition, inference and scriptural testimony as valid sources of knowledge, and deploys these to defend the soul’s existence.