The Definition and Nature of Pramāṇa According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

Summary

This article examines the epistemological views of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a 9th‑century scholar of the Nyāya school. Jayanta sought to clarify what constitutes a pramāṇa, or valid means of knowledge, distinguishing it from pramiti (knowledge) and prameya (objects of knowledge). The author reviews Jayanta’s definitions, which stress that a pramāṇa is an instrument (karaṇa) that produces cognitions which are authoritative, non‑contradictory and conducive to successful action. He discusses Jayanta’s critique of rival theories, such as the Buddhist denial of an independent pramāṇa and the Mīmāṁsā assertion that scripture is self‑evident. Jayanta argues that pramāṇas are neither inherently true nor false but derive validity from producing apprehensions that are later confirmed through practical verification. The paper also explores his typology of pramāṇas, including perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, and how he resolves tensions between them. In analysing Jayanta’s position, the author shows how he synthesises earlier Nyāya thinkers while introducing novel arguments about error, doubt and the role of intention in cognition. The article situates Jayanta’s work within the intellectual debates of Kashmir and underscores its influence on subsequent Nyāya scholarship.