चित्सुखाचार्य के अनुसार स्वप्रकाशता की अवधारणा

Summary

This article examines the philosophical doctrine of svaprakāśatā, the idea that consciousness or knowledge is self‑illuminating, as presented by the Jain scholar Niṣkuṭācārya. Drawing upon classical Pramāṇa theory, the author begins by outlining how Indian thinkers distinguish between pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) and pramā, the knowledge obtained. In Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemology, knowledge is revealed through a pramāṇa and thus needs an instrument to be apprehended. Advaita Vedānta, in contrast, holds that consciousness is self‑revealing and does not require an external instrument. Niṣkuṭācārya, working within the Jain tradition, intervenes in this debate by affirming a form of self‑luminance while maintaining the pluralistic ontological commitments of Jains. The paper discusses his critique of the Nyāya contention that cognition is known through a subsequent memory impression and his dismissal of the Bhāṭṭa notion that knowledge requires an independent cognition of itself. By analysing passages from Niṣkuṭācārya’s commentaries, the author shows how he characterizes knowledge as inherently luminous yet relationally bound to the knower. A significant portion of the article is devoted to enumerating the arguments Niṣkuṭācārya marshals—more than thirty concise reasons are tabulated—to show the incoherence of denying self‑illumination. These include textual citations from Jain āgamas, logical reflections on the absurdity of an infinite regress of illuminating cognitions, and pragmatic arguments about everyday awareness. The author also traces influences from Buddhist Yogācāra thinkers such as Dignāga, whose view of reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) parallels the Jain notion of knowledge’s reflexive character. However, Niṣkuṭācārya rejects the solipsistic tendencies of some Yogācārins and insists on the reality of external objects. In a concluding section, the paper relates the doctrine of svaprakāśatā to ethical practice, noting that Jain meditation techniques presuppose the capacity of consciousness to witness itself without mediation. By highlighting Niṣkuṭācārya’s unique synthesis of Jain pluralism with the theory of self‑luminous cognition, the article offers fresh insight into medieval Indian epistemology and illustrates the richness of Jain contributions to philosophical debates.