British Revenue Policy and Agrarian Relations in Malabar (1792-1820)
Summary
The British East India Company's revenue system and agrarian relations in Malabar (1792-1820) were shaped by the need to consolidate power and ensure uninterrupted revenue flow. Following the Treaty of Seringapatam (1792), Malabar was ceded to the Company, which appointed a joint commission to assess administrative conditions and formulate governance plans. The Company retained moral obligations to local chieftains who had aided against Tipu Sultan but excluded them from formal agreements, placing them under Company overlordship. This created conflicts, as the Company prioritized revenue reconciliation and sovereignty establishment. The traditional Malabar society featured a rigid caste hierarchy, with Nambudiri Brahmins and Nayars at the apex, intermediate castes as intermediaries, and lower castes like Cherumars at the bottom. The land tenure system included "Kanakkaran" tenants leasing from chieftains under fixed-term "Kanam" agreements and "Kuzhikanam" tenants with flexible, short-term leases. The British introduced the Ryotwari system, granting chieftains absolute land ownership while imposing revenue demands equivalent to those under Tipu Sultan, including a 50% levy. This led to widespread discontent, absentee landlordism, and economic exploitation, as many chieftains failed to meet exorbitant revenue targets. The Company retained feudal elements like "Desadhikaris" and "Adhikaris" for revenue collection and local administration, blending traditional and colonial structures. While liquidating political power of the aristocracy, the Company safeguarded their economic interests, ensuring continued surplus extraction. The revenue system exacerbated peasant exploitation, contributing to economic backwardness and poverty. The colonial administration aligned with landlords, and revenue courts oppressed the peasant class, fueling later uprisings. The Company’s policies, rooted in earlier experiences, prioritized revenue extraction over social equity, perpetuating dual exploitation by landlords and the state.
Conclusion
The British East India Company's revenue policies in Malabar (1792-1820) prioritized revenue extraction and administrative control, fundamentally altering traditional agrarian relations. By replacing feudal land tenures with Ryotwari pattas and retaining absentee jenmi landlords, the Company created dual exploitation—peasants faced oppressive demands from both landlords and colonial authorities. The rigid revenue system, set at exorbitant rates similar to the Mysorean period, led to widespread arrears and absentee landlordism, exacerbating economic backwardness. While the Company liquidated the political power of the traditional elite, it preserved feudal economic structures, reinforcing caste hierarchies and intermediary roles. This dual approach—centralized colonial rule combined with retained feudal elements—intensified social stratification and laid the groundwork for later peasant discontent. The revenue system's brutality and the Company's alignment with landlords entrenched poverty, highlighting the colonial