Jaina Philosophy of Relativism
By Mohanlal Mehta
Summary
The article "Jaina Philosophy of Relativism" by Mohan Lal Mehta explains the distinctive doctrine of non‑absolutism (anekāntavāda) and relativity (syādvāda) that underpins Jaina metaphysics and epistemology. Jaina thinkers reject the extreme positions that all entities are either absolutely permanent or absolutely momentary. Instead, they assert that reality is complex: substances are permanent in terms of their essence but momentary in their modes. Opposites like existence and non‑existence, permanence and change, identity and difference, or oneness and multiplicity can be simultaneously predicated of the same object when viewed from different standpoints (naya). Because objects possess an infinite number of characteristics (anantadharmatāmaka), judgments about them are necessarily relative. The author explains that the term syāt (maybe) used in syādvāda emphasises that statements are conditional and contextual; it introduces relativity into any assertion and prevents absolutist claims. He traces the roots of this doctrine back to the teachings of Lord Mahavira, illustrating with textual references where Mahavira spoke of the soul being permanent from one perspective and non‑permanent from another. The article also explores Umasvati’s classification of reality as substance, place, time and mode and shows how each condition determines the standpoint from which a judgement is made. To illuminate the method, Mehta discusses the celebrated example of a clay pot and shows how the pot both exists and does not exist, depending on whether one looks at its substance, place, time or mode. The doctrine is further systematised through the seven‑fold predication (saptabhaṅgī), which yields seven relational propositions about any object: (1) it exists; (2) it does not exist; (3) it both exists and does not exist successively; (4) it is indescribable; (5) it exists and is indescribable; (6) it does not exist and is indescribable; and (7) it exists, does not exist and is indescribable in different ways simultaneously. Mehta argues that these propositions collectively express the complexity of reality and avoid the one‑sidedness that leads to dogmatism. By encouraging tolerance of multiple viewpoints, syādvāda offers a philosophical foundation for intellectual pluralism and ethical non‑violence. The article emphasises that one must not confuse the standpoint‑based judgments with absolute truths; the relative judgments reflect the finite and conditioned nature of human cognition, whereas absolute knowledge can only be omniscient. In conclusion, Mehta underscores that non‑absolutism is not mere scepticism but a positive recognition of the multifaceted character of existence, and he suggests that this doctrine contributes to a more harmonious and comprehensive understanding of reality.
Conclusion
Mehta’s exposition highlights the originality and depth of the Jaina theory of non‑absolutism. By insisting that predicates are relative to standpoints and that objects possess an infinity of characteristics, the doctrine of syādvāda offers a framework that reconciles seemingly contradictory qualities and prevents philosophical dogmatism. The seven‑fold predication illustrates how Jaina logic can accommodate complexity without falling into contradictions. Ultimately, the philosophy of relativism promotes intellectual humility and tolerance, suggesting that truth is manifold and that only by recognising multiple perspectives can one approach a fuller understanding of reality.