On the Etymology of 'Puggala or Poggala'

Summary

The article "On the Etymology of 'Puggala or Poggala'" by S.M. Shaha explores the origin and semantic evolution of the term ‘puggala’ (Pali; Sanskrit ‘pudgala’), which appears in both Jain and Buddhist texts. Shaha begins by observing that Jainism and Buddhism originated within the broader Śramaṇic cultural milieu of ancient India and therefore share several technical termsfile:///home/oai/share/520754-212-427.pdf#:~:text=as%20taittMWvWama%2A%20samyag,tattvam%20%284. The term ‘puggala’ is one such term whose meaning differs across traditions. In Jain philosophy, pudgala refers to ‘matter’, one of the two eternal substances that exist alongside the plurality of souls; in Buddhist Abhidhamma, pudgala is often translated as ‘person’ or ‘individual’. Shaha examines passages from Jain scriptures such as the Bhagavatīsūtra, Tiloyapaṇṇatti and Tattvārthasūtra (through Abhayadeva’s commentary) as well as Buddhist sources like the Kathāvatthu to trace etymological explanations offered by earlier scholarsfile:///home/oai/share/520754-212-427.pdf#:~:text=as%20taittMWvWama%2A%20samyag,tattvam%20%284. He notes that Yativṛṣabha and others propose derivations based on Sanskritization of the Prakrit word, linking it to roots meaning ‘to collect’ or ‘to fill out’. Shaha argues that these explanations are unsatisfactory because they force the term into Sanskrit grammar without considering its original usage. Instead, he suggests that the term evolved from a common vernacular word denoting ‘lump’ or ‘mass’, which Jain thinkers adapted to denote the aggregate of atoms forming matter, while Buddhists reinterpreted it to describe the psycho‑physical complex constituting a ‘person’. He highlights how, in early Jain texts, pudgala encompassed both living and non‑living aggregates, whereas later commentators restricted its meaning to non‑sentient matter, reflecting doctrinal developments. Conversely, the Buddhist term ‘puggala’ was used polemically; early Buddhist schools refuted the notion of an unchanging ‘person’, yet some schools (e.g., Pudgalavādins) argued for a theoretical ‘pudgala’ that is neither identical with nor different from the five aggregates. Shaha’s analysis underscores the importance of philology in understanding philosophical debates. He concludes that the divergence in the use of ‘puggala/pudgala’ mirrors broader differences between Jain and Buddhist metaphysics: Jainism posits dualism of souls and matter, whereas Buddhism rejects permanent selfhood. The evolution of the term from a common vernacular to a technical term illustrates how linguistic choices shaped philosophical discourse.