A Note on the Jaina Conception of Substance

Summary

In this substantial essay Bimal Krishna Matilal examines the Jaina concept of a dravya or “substance” and the way this notion underpins the rest of the tradition’s metaphysics. Jain philosophers posit six types of fundamental substances – souls (jīva), matter (pudgala), motion (dharma), rest (adharma), space (ākāśa) and time (kāla). Each substance is characterised by inherent qualities (guṇa) and transient modes (paryāya). Matilal shows how these categories allow Jain thinkers to account for change without sacrificing the identity of an entity: a soul retains its enduring nature even as it undergoes a succession of karmically conditioned states. The article situates this conception against the broader backdrop of Indian metaphysics. In Nyāya‑Vaiśeṣika ontologies “substance” is tied to the relation of inherence (samavāya) and underlies qualities and motions, whereas in Advaita Vedānta the only true substance is non‑dual consciousness. Jainism, by contrast, adopts an open‑ended pluralism: a dravya can coexist with other substances in the same spatial location and its complete description requires attention to its essential nature, its attributes and its present mode. Matilal discusses the innovative Jaina doctrine of anekāntavāda (many‑sidedness), which holds that an entity can be described in multiple, apparently contradictory ways depending on the standpoint (naya) one adopts. Thus a soul is both permanent (since its substance persists) and impermanent (since its modes change). The essay also clarifies the distinction between substance and space (the latter is infinite and accommodates all other dravyas) and between substance and a mere collection of qualities. Matilal analyses canonical texts such as the Tattvārthasūtra and Ācārāṅga‑sūtra as well as later commentaries. He argues that for the Jainas, substance is not a passive substratum but an active locus of karmic bondage and liberation. The karmic particles (pudgala) adhere to the soul due to delusion and can be shed through ascetic discipline. Ultimately the article reveals how the Jaina conception of substance supports the tradition’s ethics: since every living being is a real substance with its own consciousness, non‑violence becomes the supreme moral value. Matilal’s note therefore provides both a systematic outline of Jaina ontology and a comparative assessment of how it differs from other Indian systems. His exposition demystifies technical terms like guṇa and paryāya and emphasises the dynamic, relational character of reality envisioned by Jaina thinkers.