‘Exists’ and ‘Predicate’

Summary

“‘Exists’ and ‘Predicate’” by J. L. Shaw tackles a fundamental question in philosophy of language: whether the word ‘exists’ functions as a predicate. The article surveys arguments against treating existence as a predicate, citing Immanuel Kant’s view that existence adds nothing to the concept of a thing and therefore cannot be a real predicate. It then examines positions that defend ‘exists’ as a predicate by redefining what predicates and properties are. Some logicians argue that since terms like ‘deniable’, ‘undeniable’ and ‘momentary’ are predicates and ‘exists’ can be synonymous with them, existence must be predicative. The author clarifies that much of the debate turns on divergent definitions of key terms such as ‘subject’, ‘property’, ‘quality’ and ‘real’. Shaw proposes that existence can be predicative in some contexts and non‑predicative in others. For example, in natural-language utterances where ‘exists’ functions as an attributive term, it operates like a predicate, but in logical representations of existential quantification it does not. He concludes that the question cannot be settled by definition alone; instead, philosophers must attend to the different uses of ‘exists’ in various kinds of discourse.