Number of Pramanas

Summary

Addressing a classic question in Indian epistemology, this article surveys the debate over how many pramāṇas (valid means of knowledge) should be accepted. It presents positions ranging from the Cārvāka reliance on perception alone to the Nyāya‑Vaiśeṣika acceptance of perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, the Mīmāṃsā addition of postulation and non‑perception, and the Buddhist inclusion of more subtle means. The author explains each school’s rationale, focusing in particular on the Jain contribution, which recognises multiple pramāṇas while emphasising conditional perspectives through syādvāda. The discussion includes definitions, examples and critiques of each pramāṇa, highlighting philosophical implications for ontology and soteriology. By comparing these theories, the article shows how disagreements over epistemic instruments reflect differing conceptions of reality and paths to liberation.