Upamāna‑Pramāṇa in Jain Epistemology
By K. V. Mehta
Summary
Dr. K. V. Mehta’s Sanskrit treatise investigates the concept of upamāna (analogy or comparison) within Jain epistemology. Classical Nyāya philosophers recognised upamāna as a distinct pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) used to understand a new object by likening it to a known one—for example, learning what a gavaya (wild ox) looks like by comparing it to a cow. Jain thinkers, however, debated whether upamāna constitutes an independent source of knowledge or is subsumed under inference (anumāna). Mehta surveys major Jain texts, including the works of Siddhasena Divākara, Akalaṅka and Hemacandra, to show that early scholars did not enumerate upamāna separately but treated analogy as a form of inductive reasoning reliant on previous perception. Later authors, influenced by Nyāya, began to acknowledge upamāna but still subordinated it to inference. The article analyses commentaries on Samantabhadra’s “Āptamīmāṁsā” and Devagupta’s “Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā” to illustrate how Jain logicians refined the definition of analogy. Mehta concludes that, while Jains accept the cognitive utility of comparison, they view it as a derivative pramāṇa that lacks independent status because it depends on linguistic convention and memory. The study enriches our understanding of cross‑philosophical dialogue in medieval India and highlights the nuanced positions within Jain epistemology.
Conclusion
Mehta’s essay shows that Jain philosophers engaged thoughtfully with the Nyāya theory of upamāna. While acknowledging that analogy helps learners recognise unfamiliar objects, they argued that it does not generate new knowledge independent of perception and inference. The nuanced discussion demonstrates the methodological rigour of Jain epistemology and its openness to incorporating ideas from rival schools while maintaining its distinctive emphasis on non‑absolutism (anekāntavāda).