Jayanta on the Buddhist Definition of Perception

Summary

This study analyses the eighth‑century philosopher Jayantabhaṭṭa’s critique of the Buddhist definition of perception from a Nyāya perspective. Jayanta engages with Buddhist epistemologists who define perception as a non‑conceptual cognition free from mental constructions and error. He acknowledges the Buddhist concern to distinguish valid cognition from illusory appearance but argues that their definition is both too narrow and philosophically problematic. The author outlines Jayanta’s objections. First, he contends that perception cannot be devoid of conceptual content because recognising an object invariably involves class concepts and linguistic conventions. Without some relation to universals, sense data would remain indeterminate. Second, he challenges the Buddhist claim that perception must be error‑free, noting that errors such as mistaking a rope for a snake occur at the level of perception itself. The article details Jayanta’s analysis of such errors to show that perception is not infallible and that a theory of knowledge must account for misperception. Jayanta also defends the Nyāya assertion that perception apprehends external objects as they are. He criticises the Buddhist view that objects are momentary constructions of consciousness and argues that the enduring existence of external reality is necessary to explain memory and practical activity. The article highlights Jayanta’s use of logical analysis and illustrative examples to dismantle Buddhist arguments. By examining Jayanta’s reasoning, the author reveals the richness of classical Indian debates on epistemology. The discussion demonstrates how Jayanta synthesises earlier Nyāya contributions while engaging critically with his Buddhist contemporaries. The article concludes that Jayanta’s critique not only exposes weaknesses in the Buddhist definition but also refines Nyāya’s own understanding of perception as a complex process involving sense contact, mental construction and verification.