ख्यातिवाद : प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्ड के प्रकाश में
By डॉ. वीरसागर जैन
Summary
This article, based on Ācārya Prabhācandra’s *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, explains the concept of *khyātivāda* (the theory of cognition), a key topic in Indian philosophy, particularly within Jain epistemology. *Khyātivāda* concerns false cognition (*mithyājñāna*), specifically erroneous cognition (*viparyayajñāna*), such as mistaking a rope for a snake or a seashell for silver. The central question is what is manifested or “known” in such an error. The article systematically examines and critiques seven different philosophical positions on this issue. The Cārvāka school’s *akhyātivāda* holds that no object is manifested in error, but this is rejected because erroneous cognition has a specific content. The Sautrāntika and Mādhyamika Buddhists’ *asatkhyātivāda* claims a non-existent object is manifested, but this is refuted because a completely non-existent object, like a sky-flower, never appears. The Sāṃkhya’s *prasiddhārthakhyātivāda* asserts the manifested object is real, but this would make all cognition valid and fails to explain the subsequent non-availability of the object. The Vijñānavāda Buddhist’s *ātmakhyātivāda* argues the object is a form of consciousness itself, but this is countered because the object appears as external, not internal like pleasure or pain. The Advaita Vedāntin’s *anirvacanīyārthakhyātivāda* claims the object is indescribable as either real or unreal, but this is rejected because the object is clearly described in the cognition itself. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka’s *vivekākhyātivāda* or *smṛtipramo
Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates that the Jain and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools provide the most logically coherent explanation of erroneous cognition through their theory of *viparītārthakhyāti* (the manifestation of a contrary object). By systematically refuting competing theories—including the Cārvāka denial of any manifestation, the Buddhist assertion of non-existent objects, and the Advaitic notion of the inexplicable—the text establishes that error involves the cognition of an object contrary to what is actually present, such as silver in a shell. This conclusion has significant implications for epistemology, as it preserves the distinction between valid and invalid knowledge while avoiding the logical pitfalls of other positions. For students and scholars of Indian philosophy, particularly those studying *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, this clarification resolves a traditionally difficult subject, enabling a more rigorous engagement with Jain epistemology and its sophisticated analysis of cognitive error.