A forgotten treaty between Shujauddaulah and the English
By Nandlal Chatterji
Summary
A forgotten treaty between Shujauddaulah and the English highlights the complex diplomatic dynamics between the Vazir of Oudh and the British East India Company in late 1767. Despite reports of Shujauddaulah's military preparations and alleged correspondence with the Marathas, the Rohillas, and other regional powers, the Company's leadership, including Governor Verelst and the Select Committee, dismissed the threat of immediate rupture. They believed gratitude, policy considerations, and necessity would keep the Vazir aligned with British interests. However, internal communications revealed concerns over Shujauddaulah's ambition to annex Rohilla territories and Bundelkhand, as well as his efforts to expand his army beyond what was deemed necessary for defense. Verelst eventually urged the Vazir to halt unnecessary military buildup, though tensions persisted. Col. Smith, stationed in Allahabad, remained skeptical of the Vazir's intentions, reporting on suspicious alliances and military movements. Despite these apprehensions, the Company maintained a cautious approach, balancing vigilance with diplomatic restraint to avoid appearing distrustful. The period underscored the fragile nature of alliances in 18th-century India and the strategic maneuvering of both regional rulers and colonial powers.
Conclusion
This forgotten treaty between Shujauddaulah and the English reveals a critical yet overlooked episode in colonial diplomacy, showcasing how Verelst’s strategic balancing act between deterrence and alliance management temporarily stabilized relations. Despite Col. Smith’s alarming reports of Shujauddaulah’s potential Maratha alliances and military buildup, the Select Committee’s pragmatic assessment of the Vazir’s limited capacity for rebellion and their emphasis on maintaining gratitude and necessity as binding forces underscored the East India Company’s evolving approach to managing regional powers. The treaty’s significance lies in its unspoken acknowledgment of Shujauddaulah’s ambitions—particularly his desire to annex Rohilla territories—while curbing overt hostility through calculated diplomacy. Verelst’s refusal to provoke conflict, coupled with his focus on external threats like the Abdali and Haidar Ali, highlights the Company’s prioritization of regional stability over immediate confrontation. This document thus offers valuable insights into the nuanced power dynamics of the period, emphasizing how strategic inaction and controlled military permissiveness were employed to preserve fragile alliances,