Nairatmya and Karman
By Maryla Falk
Summary
The article tackles the apparent contradiction between two central doctrines in Buddhism: nairātmyā (the absence of a permanent self) and karman (the law of moral causation and rebirth). It approaches the problem through the intellectual journey of Louis de La Vallée Poussin, a scholar deeply devoted to both Buddhism and Christianity. For him, the antinomy between nairātmyā and karman reflected an inner struggle between his Buddhist scholarship and Christian faith. The article observes that Poussin repeatedly sought to reconcile the doctrines yet often re‑examined and revised his conclusions, showing scholarly honesty. The author outlines how Western Buddhology often interprets nairātmyā as the negation of an individual soul, equating it with the Upaniṣadic ātman that Buddhism rejects. This reading leads to the paradox that if there is no self, who transmigrates? The article suggests that misapplying Western ontological categories to Buddhist concepts causes confusion. In fact, canonical texts describe nāma (mind) and rūpa (body) as processes and emphasise dependent origination rather than a permanent entity. Karman operates through conditioning in a stream of causally connected moments rather than through a static self. The article discusses how Poussin’s Christian convictions may have limited his acceptance of nairātmyā as a complete denial of self. It notes that he interpreted karman as implying continuity of an individual subject, whereas other scholars view rebirth as continuity of causal processes without an enduring soul. The author calls for abandoning the search for an identical transmigrating entity and instead understanding karman through the doctrine of dependent origination. He criticises early Western scholars for projecting their own metaphysical assumptions onto Buddhist texts. In conclusion, the article argues that the perceived contradiction between nairātmyā and karman arises from misinterpretation. Correctly understood, Buddhism teaches that while there is no permanent self, the chain of causation continues through volitional actions and mental formations. La Vallée Poussin’s struggle exemplifies how personal beliefs can influence scholarship. Recognising this helps clarify the doctrinal harmony within Buddhism.
Conclusion
The article concludes that the supposed conflict between nairātmyā and karman is a product of imposing Western notions of a permanent soul onto Buddhist doctrine. In Buddhism, there is no enduring self; karman operates through a continuum of causally connected processes. Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s difficulty in reconciling these doctrines reflects his Christian background rather than a flaw in Buddhist thought. By focusing on dependent origination and the impersonal nature of causation, scholars can appreciate the coherence of Buddhist teachings. The article urges abandoning self‑based interpretations and recognising that karman does not require a transmigrating entity.