Two Types of Subjectivism in Monistic Vedanta

Summary

This philosophical article explores two schools of subjectivist interpretation within Advaita Vedānta. Starting from Śaṅkara’s absolute monism—where the ultimate reality (Brahman) is the only truth and the world of multiplicity is illusory—it examines how later thinkers attempted to resolve the relationship between the individual experience and the absolute. The first type, called dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, posits that perception itself creates the world: the universe is a mental projection of the jīva, and objects have no existence independent of consciousness. This view emphasises that the distinction between seer and seen is illusory; the apparent world arises simultaneously with perception and dissolves when perception ceases. The second type, termed dṛṣṭi-samāna-samaya-sṛṣṭi-vāda, asserts that perception and world-creation occur at the same time as a result of beginningless ignorance (avidyā). While still subjectivist, this view allows for a common world shared by multiple perceivers because their ignorance is collectively similar. The article analyses arguments from the works of Prakāśātman, Vimuktātman and later Advaitins, comparing them with Yogācāra Buddhism and the concept of vikalpa (conceptual construction). It notes that these theories attempt to defend Advaita against criticism that its doctrine collapses into solipsism. The author concludes that both types of subjectivism acknowledge the primacy of consciousness but differ in how they explain intersubjective experience. He highlights the dialectical method used by Vedāntic writers to refine monism and integrate phenomenological concerns.