असितगति-श्रावकाचार में स्वज्ञसिद्धि

Summary

The text discusses the nature of knowledge and the existence of an omniscient being (sarvajna) from a Jain philosophical perspective. It begins by noting that ordinary knowledge is limited because it depends on sensory instruments, each restricted to specific objects, such as the eye perceiving only form. The Jain view, however, holds that knowledge is an inherent quality of the soul and occurs without any instrument. The soul can know subtle, distant, past, and future objects when free from karmic coverings, and when all coverings are removed, infinite and extrasensory knowledge (kevala jnana) arises. The text then addresses three objections raised by Mimamsakas against the possibility of an omniscient being: first, that all beings have limited knowledge and attachment; second, that absence (abhava) as a means of proof negates the omniscient being; and third, that there is no valid proof for such a being. The author refutes these by arguing that only one who knows all persons across time could deny omniscience, which would itself prove omniscience; that absence cannot apply to extrasensory objects; and that inference supports omniscience, as uncontradicted knowledge is accepted like self-evident pleasure. The text further establishes omniscience through the gradation of knowledge, culminating in a being with perfect knowledge. It then argues that only Jina is omniscient, as others like Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, Kapila, and Buddha possess faults like attachment and anger. The author critiques the concept of a supreme Brahman, noting that if its parts are flawed, it cannot be flawless. Similarly, the Nyaya-Vaisheshika God is rejected because the argument for a creator implies a body, which is not universally perceptible and cannot create all things. Buddha’s omniscience is denied due to contradictions in his doctrines, such as the self-refuting claim of universal emptiness. Kapila is also rejected for considering knowledge a property of inert matter rather than the conscious self. The text concludes that only