नैयायिक ज्ञान का साधन प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण
By Hemlata Srivastava
Summary
In this Hindi article the author discusses perception (pratyakṣa) as conceived by the Naiyāyikas, the logicians of the Nyāya school. After introducing Nyāya’s four pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge), namely perception, inference, comparison and testimony, the paper focuses on the first. It explains that perception arises when the senses come into contact with an object and produce a cognition that is non‑verbal and immediate. The Naiyāyikas distinguish between indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception; the former apprehends qualities without conceptual categorisation, while the latter involves recognition and naming. The author analyses classic examples used in Nyāya texts, such as the perception of a cow or a pot, to illustrate how determinate perception integrates sense data with memory and linguistic conventions. Objections from Buddhist idealists are addressed and counterarguments are provided. The paper concludes by emphasising the importance of pratyakṣa as the foundation of knowledge and its continuing relevance in epistemology.
Conclusion
A clear exposition of Nyāya’s theory of perception underscores the school’s lasting relevance. Understanding the nuances of pratyakṣa enriches both historical scholarship and modern epistemology.