Bhasarvaji’s Definition of Anumana – An Observation
By Laxman V. Joshi
Summary
Bhasarvaji defines inference (anumana) in his *Nyayasara* as an indirect means of knowledge relying on valid invariable concomitance (apavaada). The text presents a debate among commentators over the correct interpretation of the term *g%* in this definition. While some, like Jayasimha Suri, link *g%* to *3Iamrs* (suggesting inference operates through universals), others, such as Raghava Bhatta, argue for *qUrgad* (inferential cognition as a distinct process). V. P. Vaidya critiques the *3Iamrs* interpretation, noting that Bhasarvaji’s own *Nyayabhusana* supports *39UGTIHT* (inference as mediate knowledge). He further asserts that *g%* qualifies *37393* in most definitions but not in inference, where it refutes Carvaka’s denial of inference by emphasizing valid concomitance over perception alone. Vaidya also highlights that Bhasarvaji’s construction aligns with countering Buddhist views, asserting inference’s reliability. Other commentators like Vasudeva and Apararkadeva largely follow Bhasarvaji’s stance, though Apararkadeva acknowledges potential illusions in inference. The discussion underscores the intentional ambiguity in *g%*’s placement to address philosophical objections while maintaining textual coherence.
Conclusion
Bhasarvaji’s analysis of Anumana as indirect experience mediated by invariable concomitance offers critical insights into Nyaya epistemology, particularly its response to Carvaka skepticism. By emphasizing the necessity of right concomitance (3% 3JAAMTE), he establishes inference as a valid, non-perceptual means of knowledge, countering the Carvaka denial of apoha (exclusion) and universal truths. The text highlights the unresolved controversy over the construction of the term g%, with Vaidya’s critique underscoring the logical coherence of Raghava Bhatta’s interpretation over Jayasimha Suri’s. Ultimately, Bhasarvaji’s formulation not only clarifies the mechanism of inference but also reinforces its role in overcoming radical empiricism, affirming the Nyaya system’s capacity to address epistemological challenges through rigorous logical frameworks. This contribution remains pivotal in understanding the evolution of Indian logical thought.