Harivarman's Theory of Cognition
By N. Aiyaswami Sastri
Summary
This philosophical essay explores the theory of cognition expounded by Harivarman, author of the Satyasiddhi śāstra. The author outlines Harivarman’s critique of Abhidharma atomism and his assertion that phenomena lack inherent substance. Harivarman proposes that cognition arises dependently through the interaction of sense faculties, objects and consciousness and that no permanent subject underlies these events. The article analyses his classification of perception, memory and inference and notes his anticipation of later Yogācāra notions of consciousness‑only. Harivarman rejects both the realist and extreme nihilist positions and emphasises a middle path that affirms empirical experience while denying metaphysical essences. The essay situates his thought within the broader Buddhist discourse on epistemology and demonstrates its influence on subsequent philosophers.
Conclusion
The author concludes that Harivarman’s theory of cognition represents an important bridge between early and classical Buddhist philosophy. By analysing cognition without positing a self, he contributed to the development of Buddhist epistemology and inspired later schools to refine their understandings of knowledge and consciousness.